Nominal GDP Level Targeting*

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Abstract

We consider the pros (and a few of the cons) of a monetary policy framework in which the principal goal is the targeting of a path for nominal GDP. We argue that it could lead to a significant improvement in economic performance over the current inflation targeting framework. It is more robust in the face of aggregate supply shocks and when it is difficult to identify the different shocks that are hitting the economy. It also provides a way of effectively providing economic stimulus in periods of recession or crisis.

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1 Introduction

The idea that central banks should adopt a monetary policy framework in which the principal goal is the stabilization of nominal GDP has a long history in academic and policy circles. (I will henceforth refer to targeting a path for nominal GDP as NGDPLT or nominal gross domestic product level targeting.) Selgin (2018) summarizes this long intellectual history starting with the book by Samuel Bailey (1837) and including Hayek (2008), Meade (1993) and Tobin (1980).


The goal of this chapter is to do a selective survey of the literature on NGDPLT. I will attempt more to synthesize than to innovate, while standing on the shoulders of many recent scholars. Many of these scholars belong to the so-called “market monetarist” school, perhaps the first school of economic thought to develop primarily on the web (Christensen 2011). The key publications of the market monetarist school include Sumner (2011, 2012, 2013, 2019), Beckworth (2010, 2017, 2019, 2019b), Hendrickson (2012, 2012b), Beckworth and Hendrickson (2019), Hetzel (2009, 2012, 2015), Christensen (2011), Nunes and Cole (2013), and Rowe (2011).

After a brief discussion of what NGDPLT entails, I summarize (in the third section)
the main arguments in favour of NGDPLT. In the fourth section I consider the possible objections to NGDPLT and whether or not they are well founded. The fifth section offers conclusions.

2 What Does NGDPLT Entail?

Nominal gross domestic product is a measure of the monetary value (dollars in Canada) of total spending on final goods and services in the economy. NGDPLT entails specifying a growth path for total spending and tailoring monetary policy in order to hit that target. If current nominal GDP were below the growth path, monetary policy would become more expansionary. If were above the growth path, it monetary policy would be tightened.

NGDPLT is compatible with different choices for the central bank’s main policy instrument. This could mean using a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target or controlling a short-term nominal interest rate, as is currently the case of most central banks with explicit inflation targets. We will have more to say about this below in the context of the zero lower bound on central banks’ policy rates.

In the case where the central bank’s instrument is a short-term interest rate (currently, the Bank of Canada’s main policy instrument is the target overnight rate) the central bank would follow a feedback rule of the following form.

\[ i_t = i^* + \alpha \times \ln (GDP_t - GDP_t^*) . \] (1)

Here, \( i_t \) is the value of the central bank’s policy interest rate, \( i^* \) is the neutral policy rate compatible with nominal GDP being on its target path, and \( \ln (GDP_t - GDP_t^*) \) is the proportional (in logs) gap between the current level of nominal GDP (\( GDP_t \)) and the target (\( GDP_t^* \)). The \( \alpha \) parameter The target level of nominal GDP would

1The overnight rate is the interest rate at which banks lend to each other in the overnight market.
normally follow an exponential growth path, so that

\[ \ln (GDP_t^*) = \ln (GDP_0^*) + \beta \times t, \]

where \( \beta \) is the predetermined growth rate of nominal GDP along the target path. This would normally be constant, and could be chosen to equal the sum of the estimated growth rate of (real) potential output and a targeted average rate of inflation.

With NGDPLT we can express the central bank’s feedback rule very simply (more on this below) and it has the advantage of depending on only one variable, the current level of nominal GDP.

Data on nominal GDP are typically published with a lag, so that \( GDP_t \) is not directly observable by the central bank when it makes its decision concerning \( i_t \). In practice, the central bank will have to estimate the current level of nominal GDP (more on this below) so that its feedback rule can be written as

\[ i_t = i^* + \alpha \times \ln (E_t(GDP_t) - GDP_t^*), \]

(2)

where \( E_t(GDP_t) \) is the central bank’s best estimate of current nominal GDP based on available information at time \( t \).

NGDPLT allows the central bank to achieve (on average) a targeted rate of inflation as long as it can forecast the rate of growth of potential (real) GDP. For example, if potential GDP grows at a rate of 2 percent, then a targeted growth rate of nominal GDP of 4 percent will lead, on average, to an inflation rate of 2 percent. Note also that if nominal GDP grows at a constant rate, inflation will be counter-cyclical. If real GDP grows faster than potential, which it does during the expansion phase of the cycle, inflation will be lower to maintain a constant rate of growth of nominal spending.
3 The Advantages of NGDPLT

3.1 NGDPLT is a History-Dependent Rule

The "L" in NGDPLT is important. Targeting a path for nominal GDP means that the central bank must correct for past deviations of nominal GDP from its targeted path. If an unexpected negative shock pushes nominal GDP below its target path (the analysis of a positive shock is completely symmetric), monetary policy must become more expansionary, sufficiently so for nominal GDP growth to become greater than its average rate so that it can catch up to its growth path.

This has two important consequences. The first consequence is the impact of the NGDPLT framework on expectations. If the framework is credible, individuals will come to expect a higher rate of real growth and a higher rate of total spending than they otherwise would. This will have a positive impact on both consumption and investment spending, and means that the central bank’s policy will have to be less expansionary to achieve the same effect on demand. Monetary policy has to work less hard to achieve the same results.

The second consequence is that level targeting or level path targeting constitutes a form of credible commitment. Optimal monetary policy in the absence of an ability to pre-commit to future policies is referred to in the literature as optimal discretionary monetary policy. The distinction commitment and discretion is crucial. Plosser (2007) gives good working definitions:

Commitment means delivering, in any particular situation, on past promises. In other words, the policymaker unequivocally will follow through on a promise made about future actions. Discretion, on the other hand, means that the policymaker is not bound by previous actions or plans and thus is free to make an independent decision every period.

A standard result from the literature on game theory and economic policy is that
optimal policy with pre-commitment can achieve a higher level of economic welfare than policy under discretion. Without commitment, in many cases it will be optimal (in terms of economic welfare) for the central bank to deviate from its announced policy path. However, if does so its announced policy path will no longer be credible and the beneficial effects on expectations alluded to above will be lost.

Adopting a level target can act as a substitute for commitment when optimizing. This has been shown in the context of price-level path targeting (henceforth PLT) versus inflation targeting (henceforth IT). Vestin (2006) showed a remarkable result: by assigning to a central bank the objective of targeting a path for the price level, it can (under certain assumptions) achieve under discretion the same level of economic welfare that it could under commitment with an inflation target.

The intuition for Vestin’s result is straightforward. Assigning the central bank an objective function that depends on price-level deviations, rather than inflation, has the effect of conditioning the expectations of agents in the private sector. A positive inflation shock (due for example to an unexpected increase in production costs for firms) reduces expectations of future inflation, since lower inflation is necessary to get the price level back to its predetermined growth path. This has the same effect as if the central bank acted optimally and could commit to its future policy. Giving this objective function to the central bank is a substitute for commitment.

The Bank of Canada’s current IT regime does not have this property of history dependence. If inflation falls below its 2 percent target, the level of the consumer price index falls below what it otherwise would have been. The Bank eases monetary policy in order to get inflation back up to target. The price level remains on a path below its previous trajectory. This is known as price-level drift, and means that the price level is harder to predict farther into the future, making contracts between parties that specify nominal payments subject to uncertainty. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) first showed that optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price-level
stationarity (and perfect predictability in the absence of shocks) in the standard New Keynesian model. This implies that current IT regimes in which past shocks to the price level are treated as bygones are suboptimal.

### 3.2 NGDPLT Avoids the Indeterminacy Problem

The current IT regime as practised by the Bank of Canada and by many other central banks around the world involves using a short-term interest rate to affect aggregate demand, thereby indirectly affecting the rate of inflation. The goal is to bring inflation to a target value within a planning horizon of a few quarters. Canada’s targeted rate of inflation is 2 percent, and the Bank aims to keep inflation within a target band of 1 percent to 3 percent except in exceptional circumstances.

IT has a major theoretical drawback. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) show that under IT and monetary policy that follows a Taylor rule, the economy always has two long-run equilibria once it is understood that the central bank’s policy interest rate cannot fall below a minimum.

One of them involves inflation at target and output at potential. This is the good equilibrium. The other occurs when the policy rate is stuck at its lower bound and output is below potential: this is the bad equilibrium. This multiple equilibrium problem is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The green curve is the Taylor rule itself and shows how the central bank’s policy rate responds to inflation. In the long run, the nominal policy rate has to equal the real interest rate (which is taken as given and constant) plus the rate of inflation — this is the so-called Fisher condition. There are two points where the blue (Fisher condition) and green curves intersect, and therefore two possible long-run equilibria.

The upward-sloping portion of the green Taylor rule curve has a slope greater than one: the central bank’s policy rate increases more than one-for-one with inflation. In

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2. Amano, Ambler and Shukayev (2012) analyze when price-level stationarity is not optimal when the central bank must choose its monetary policy before observing all shocks.

3. The lower bound on the policy rate is mildly negative once one accounts for the costs of holding cash. Several central banks such as Sweden’s Riksbank, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank have had negative policy rates at different times since the financial crisis.
this region, the so-called Taylor principle is satisfied. The Taylor principle says the following. In order to be able to achieve a target inflation rate, the central bank must be able to increase the real interest rate by more than an unexpected increase in the rate of inflation (and vice versa) in order to decrease aggregate demand and bring inflation back down. Consequently, the central bank’s nominal policy rate must be able to vary by more than the increase in inflation for the real interest rate to increase. At low interest rates and close to the bad equilibrium, the central bank cannot vary its policy interest rate by as much as the inflation rate varies. The result is dynamic indeterminacy in the region of the bad long-run equilibrium: many different dynamic equilibria are possible in such an environment, and starting from a situation with low inflation and high unemployment the economy may actually be drawn towards the bad steady state rather than gravitating towards the steady state with full employment and

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inflation equal to its target.

This property of IT regimes might appear to be just a theoretical curiosity. However, Bullard (2010) argued that this explains why Japan went through its “lost decade.” He also claimed that the U.S. was in danger at that time of falling into a similar low-output trap. Subsequent to the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, many central banks had policy interest rates that were at or close to their effective lower bounds.

Because NGDPLT pins down the level of a nominal variable (total spending) it cannot suffer from the same indeterminacy problem as IT.\(^5\)

3.3 NGDPLT is Superior to both IT and PLT in the Face of Supply Shocks

Both IT and PLT suffer from a major drawback. They lead the central bank to increase (decrease) its policy rate in response to an increase (decrease) in the rate of inflation, irrespective of the reason for the change in inflation. If the underlying cause of the change is a shock to aggregate demand, output and inflation tend to move in the same direction. With nominal frictions (sticky prices and wages), output moves away from full-employment output, and an active monetary policy can improve economic welfare.

A shock to aggregate supply has the effect of moving output and prices in opposite directions. If the shock is temporary, active monetary policy can improve economic welfare, but under IT and PLT monetary policy may in fact make things worse.

Consider a temporary negative aggregate supply shock (the case of a positive shock is symmetric).\(^6\) This pushes real output below its frictionless level, and also leads to an increase in the price level and inflation. Under strict IT or PLT, the central bank must

\(^5\) Ambler and Lam (2016) demonstrate an analogous result that the PLT regime is not subject to the same indeterminacy as IT.

\(^6\) For the sake of concreteness, assume a temporary positive shock to the markup of prices over marginal costs.
tighten monetary policy in order to reduce aggregate demand and inflation. This exacerbates the negative impact on output. Under NGDPLT, because inflation and real output growth move in opposite directions, the impact on the rate of growth of nominal GDP will be very small.\footnote{If the price elasticity of the aggregate demand curve is equal to minus one, there will be no impact on NGDP growth, and the central bank will not have to react at all to the shock.}

In fact, central banks with inflation targets typically are not strict inflation targeters, but rather employ what is called flexible inflation targeting. This means that they can decide not to counteract a change in prices or inflation in the short run depending on the economic situation. They can respond to changes in unemployment and output as well as fluctuations in the inflation rate.

However, in order not to do the wrong thing in response to an aggregate supply shock, central banks have to be able to distinguish among the types of shocks hitting the economy when they formulate their monetary policy. Hetzel (2009, 2012) argues persuasively that poor monetary policy by the Fed and other central banks in 2008 exacerbated the severity of the Great Recession. They failed to recognize the importance of the rise in energy prices (a negative supply shock) on inflation. He states (2009, pages 211–212):

> With the energy price shock that began in the summer of 2004, central banks initially allowed headline inflation to rise. I argue in the next section that the world’s major central banks, in the summer of 2008, despite deteriorating economic activity, became unwilling to lower their policy rates because of fear that headline inflation in excess of core inflation would raise inflationary expectations. The resulting monetary stringency turned a moderate recession into a major recession.

This means that IT and PLT are subject to what Beckworth (2017, page 2) refers to as a **knowledge problem.** “The knowledge problem in this context is that Fed officials are unlikely to know in real time what kind of shock is causing changes in inflation.
Knowing the difference, however, is crucial, because responding to supply-shock-driven movements in inflation could destabilize the economy.” NGDPLT is a robust regime that works without having to identify the underlying shocks affecting the economy.

The argument developed in this section can be illustrated with a simple aggregate supply/aggregate demand analysis of the kind found in many undergraduate textbooks such as Cowen and Tabarrok (2018) See Figure 2 below.

The rate of change of real output is measured on the horizontal axis. Inflation is measured on the vertical axis. The long-run aggregate supply curve (LRAS) is vertical, and potential output is assumed to be growing at an annual rate of 3 percent. The aggregate demand curve (AD) traces the combinations of real growth and inflation that keep total spending growing at the same rate, in this case 5 percent. In the long run, aggregate demand is growing at 5 percent per year, so that inflation is equal to 2 percent. The short run aggregate supply curve (SRAS)

Consider now a positive shock to aggregate demand, which comes about for example from an increase in government spending. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. The right panel shows what would happen if the central bank could perfectly control aggregate demand with its monetary policy. Under an IT regime, the central bank would raise its policy rate in order to reduce both aggregate demand and inflation, thereby offsetting the initial increase in demand. This is exactly the same at what the central bank would do under NGDPLT. Under the two regimes, the response to an aggregate demand shock would be identical and furthermore would be optimal.

Figure 4 below illustrates the case of a temporary (negative) aggregate supply shock. The shock leads to an increase in inflation and a drop in output below its full-employment level, as shown in the left-hand panel of the figure. The response of the central bank under IT is illustrated in the right-hand panel. Since inflation has increased, the central bank must tighten monetary policy enough that inflation falls

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8The graphs are from Beckworth (2010).
back to 2 percent. This exacerbates the drop in real output, pushing it further away from its full-employment level. Under NGDPLT, the central bank would not respond. Output remains below its full-employment level, but at least the central bank does not exacerbate the negative impact of the shock on output.

Selgin (2018) notes that money prices may be more responsive to supply shocks than demand shocks. If this is the case, then the slope of the short-run aggregate supply...
Figure 3: Positive Aggregate Demand Shock

Figure 4: Temporary Aggregate Supply Shock
curve in response to temporary aggregate supply shocks would be steeper than in response to demand shocks. In this case, NGDPLT would be even more robust as a monetary policy strategy that does not force the central bank to identify the source of the shocks affecting the economy.

Figure 5 covers the case of a permanent aggregate supply shock.

Figure 5: Permanent Aggregate Supply Shock

The left-hand panel illustrates the impact of a permanent, positive aggregate supply shock, in this case an increase in the rate of technological progress. If nominal spending growth remains constant, the economy’s equilibrium remains on its (new) long-run aggregate supply curve. This is just the equilibrium that the economy would achieve without nominal frictions, and is the best outcome that monetary policy could achieve. This is exactly what happens under NGDPLT.

Under IT, the response of the central bank is once again inappropriate. The drop in inflation leads the central bank to ease monetary policy. Aggregate demand increases until inflation returns to 2 percent. The new equilibrium of the economy is at a point
where output is above its full-employment level.

### 3.4 NGDPLT is Based on Observable Variables

As noted in the previous subsection, in order for IT to work well, the central bank must be able to distinguish among the different possible sources of shocks that affect the economy.

Central bank behaviour under IT can be well approximated by a Taylor rule\(^9\) of the following form.

\[
i_t = i^* + \alpha_1 (\pi_t - \pi^*) + \alpha_2 (y_t - y^*_t).\tag{3}\]

Here, as in the feedback rule in equation (1) above, \(i_t\) is the central bank’s policy rate, \(i^*\) is the long-run or neutral value of that rate, and \(\pi_t\) is the inflation rate, \(\pi^*\) is the inflation target, \(y_t\) is current real GDP, and \(y^*_t\) is potential output, so that \((y_t - y^*_t)\) is a measure of the output gap.

This is a more complicated feedback rule than under NGDPLT. It involves knowing the current levels of both inflation and real output, and it also depends on knowing the value of potential output. The latter variable is not observable and must be estimated using a full-blown structural model of the economy or sophisticated statistical techniques. Even if most central banks do not explicitly follow Taylor rules, the output gap is an important input into their decision making processes. One reason for this is that inflation is related to the output gap in their forecasting models via the New Keynesian Phillips curve (see Roberts 1995), which is a critical component of the forecasting and policy-analysis models of all inflation-targeting central banks.

This means that NGDPLT is simpler than IT and is based completely on observable variables (even if these variables are only observed with a lag and subject to some measurement error — we return to the measurement of nominal GDP in the next section dealing with critiques of NGDPLT).

3.5 NGDPLT is Better in a Low-Inflation Environment

Equilibrium real interest rates have gradually been decreasing since the first central banks adopted official inflation targets in the early 1990s. The Bank of Canada (2020) now estimates that the long-run neutral interest rate in Canada lies somewhere between 2.25 percent and 3.25 percent. This is much lower than average short-term nominal interest rates before the Great Recession.

The main implication is that under IT central banks have less room to lower their policy rates before hitting their effective lower bound. Kiley and Roberts (2017) estimate that for the U.S. economy the Fed’s policy rate could be at its effective lower bound much more frequently than before the Great Recession, as often as 31.7 percent of the time if the neutral nominal interest rate is as low as 3 percent, which would be close to the upper end of the range of the Bank of Canada’s latest estimate.

As noted above, inflation under NGDPLT is counter-cyclical if the rate of growth of nominal spending can be maintained. The short-term nominal interest rate is just equal to the short-term real interest rate plus the expected rate of inflation, following the well-known Fisher equation. If expected inflation is also counter-cyclical this means that under NGDPLT the short-term nominal interest rate should fall by less during slowdowns or contractions of real GDP as long as the growth rate of nominal spending can be maintained.

This raises the question of the feasibility of maintaining nominal spending growth in reaction to negative demand and/or supply shocks.

3.6 NGDPLT Provides a Superior Way of Providing Stimulus at the Lower Bound

Recessions are associated by definition with falls in real output. In practice, historical recessions have also been associated with falls in the level of nominal output.
Avoiding falls in nominal spending through the use of NGDPLT could reduce the likelihood of the economy falling into recession.

Since NGDPLT is a history-dependent monetary policy framework, as argued above the central bank has to work less hard to meet its nominal income growth target because of the way expectations work. A shortfall or drop in nominal spending growth sets up the expectation that in the medium run spending growth will be above average, which encourages spending and boosts aggregate demand. This means that for a central bank that uses a short-term nominal interest rate as its policy instrument, the lower bound should bind much less frequently under NGDPLT than under IT.

On the rare occasions where the effective lower bound on the policy rate binds, NGDPLT could be implemented by switching to a non-conventional monetary policy instrument such as quantitative easing (henceforth QE). In this context, NGDPLT can be thought of as a velocity-adjusted money growth strategy. This is best understood in the context of the quantity theory equation in growth rates:

$$\dot{M}_t + \dot{v}_t = \pi_t + \dot{y}_t. \quad (4)$$

Here, dots on variables indicate rates of change. $\dot{M}_t$ is the rate of growth of a suitable monetary aggregate, $\dot{v}_t$ is the rate of change of the velocity of circulation of money, $\pi_t$ is the rate of inflation, and $\dot{y}_t$ is the rate of growth of real GDP. The right-hand side of the equation is just the rate of growth of nominal GDP.

Figure 6 below shows the long-run relationship between nominal income and money growth over the period 1981-2018 for a cross-section of countries.

Velocity can fluctuate in the short term, but over the long haul it has historically been stable, except for a gradual downward trend. This means that total spending moves
in lock step with the growth of the money supply, at least in the long run. Under QE, the central bank adjusts the size of its balance sheet through suitable open market operations. If it transacts only with banks, it can directly affect the size of the narrowest of monetary aggregates, the base money supply. However, if it can transact directly with households and firms (see Congdon 2010 for a detailed description of the mechanics of what he terms “credit market operations”), the central bank can directly affect the size of private sector deposits at banks, thereby affecting broader monetary aggregates.\footnote{As outlined in Buiter (2014), this can be done either in coordination with the Treasury (Department of Finance) or completely independently. Such transactions affect the intertemporal budget constraint of the government: it would then be up to the government to adjust its fiscal policy by changing its tax receipts, its spending, or its borrowing. The central bank would not have to take a stance on fiscal policy.}
Velocity is subject to fluctuations for exogenous reasons. This can include changes in transactions technology that affect the ability of individuals to shift their portfolios across different assets with differing degrees of liquidity. It can also include drastic decreases in velocity during financial crises that result from flights towards safe assets and sudden increases in the demand for liquidity. Such a decrease in velocity occurred during the financial crisis in 2008 in the US. The growth of broad monetary aggregates and velocity both decreased along with inflation and real growth heading into the Great Recession. As is well known, the monetary base increased rapidly during the Great Recession, but not fast enough to compensate for the dramatic drop in base velocity, as illustrated in Figure 7 below.

![Figure 7: Base and Base Velocity](image)

In addition to these exogenous changes, Ambler (2017) shows that velocity can be
very sensitive to shifts in monetary policy. In particular, an increase in the money supply (or money supply growth) that is expected to be temporary will typically lead to an endogenous decrease in velocity, little change in inflation or output, and a depressed nominal interest rate. Knowing that the money supply increase is temporary, firms will limit the amount by which they increase their prices when they reset them. Also, expectations of future real interest rate increases at the end of the temporary monetary expansion.

This means that in order for QE to boost inflation and output and to lift the nominal interest rate off its lower bound, it must be permanent and must be expected to be permanent. For this reason, an NGDPLT regime is ideally suited to increase the effectiveness of QE. If money growth and velocity have decreased due to the type of financial crisis that brought on the Great Recession, a policy of QE will quite credibly be seen as permanent because of the history-dependent nature of the regime. Once total spending returns to its growth path, broad monetary aggregates will also return to their growth path (given the long-run stability of velocity).

3.7 NGDPLT Favours Central Bank Accountability

Central bank independence can be a good thing, but not without accountability (Hetzel 2012b). Central banks that are flexible inflation targeters try to stabilize real GDP along with stabilizing inflation around a target. The performance of central banks under IT has often been measured by looking at both inflation volatility and real GDP growth volatility. For this reason, an NGDPLT regime is ideally suited to increase the effectiveness of QE. If money growth and velocity have decreased due to the type of financial crisis that brought on the Great Recession, a policy of QE will quite credibly be seen as permanent because of the history-dependent nature of the regime. Once total spending returns to its growth path, broad monetary aggregates will also return to their growth path (given the long-run stability of velocity).

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Focusing on a single target makes accountability much easier. Also, since NGDPLT is history-dependent, central banks targeting a path for total spending would be responsible for correcting or making up for past failures to hit its target. Under IT, many central banks have consistently undershot their targets since the end of the Great Depression.

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14 Beckworth (2017b) also forcefully makes this argument.
15 See Cecchetti et al. (2006).
Recession. In some cases this has led to a softening of inflation expectations, which reflects a loss of credibility. In turn, the loss of credibility makes monetary policy less effective. A credible NGDPLT regime would anchor expectations of nominal spending growth.

3.8 NGDPLT Favours Financial Stability

Debt contracts are typically not state-contingent. In fact they stipulate payments in nominal terms. The reasons for this are not well understood, but presumably the complexity of state-contingent contracts and the difficulty of verifying their terms make them too expensive. This makes financial markets incomplete in a very important respect.

It turns out that NGDPLT can substitute to some extent for incomplete financial markets. Because inflation is counter-cyclical under NGDPLT, the real debt burden of borrowers is pro-cyclical. This improves the risk-sharing properties of non-contingent contracts. This has been shown in theoretical models by Koenig (2013), Sheedy (2014), and Bullard and DiCecio (2019).

Borrowers’ ability to service their debt is highly dependent on their nominal incomes. Financial crises happen when individuals (households and firms) are unable to free up enough income to service their debts in a given month.

Beckworth (2019) shows that there is strong empirical cross-country evidence that stability in nominal income growth is associated with financial stability.

4 The Possible Disadvantages of NGDPLT

No monetary policy framework is perfect. The IT framework adopted by many central banks starting in 1991 performed well, indeed better than some pundits expected.

Kronick and Ambler (2020) show that the debt service ratio (debt service payments as a fraction of disposable income) is an important predictor of financial fragility.
When it was first adopted in New Zealand and Canada it was almost a stopgap measure in response to the poor performance of monetary gradualism (reducing inflation by gradually reducing the growth rate of a suitable monetary aggregate). The theoretical underpinnings of IT were actually developed after it had been implemented by several central banks and had successfully reduced both average inflation and inflation volatility. Its deficiencies became apparent during and in the wake of the Great Recession.

4.1 NGDPLT depends on Timely Information on GDP

IT has one major advantage over NGDPLT: information on the current rate of inflation is available with much less of a delay than on nominal GDP, and it is less subject to revision. However, as noted in the previous section, most central banks that target inflation are flexible inflation targeters. They use the output gap as part of their decision process. This means using a variable (real GDP) that is also observed with a substantial lag and is subject to revision, and a variable (potential output) that is not observable at all.

In Canada, Statistics Canada publishes information on the consumer price index and headline inflation for a given month approximately three weeks into the following month. In the case of GDP, it takes two full months for Statistics Canada to publish preliminary estimates of the industry-based estimates of monthly GDP, and two months to publish preliminary estimates of expenditure-based GDP for the preceding quarter.

This objection can be largely overcome in two possible ways. First, techniques for now-casting variables such as GDP have become relatively sophisticated. Using big data, now-casts of current GDP are quite accurate. See for example Chernis and Sekkel (2017).

17Laidler (2015) contains a detailed exposition of the interaction between the theory and practice of inflation targeting, with an emphasis on the Canadian experience.
Nominal GDP statistics are subject to revisions, typically several rounds of revisions over a period of several quarters, which is not the case with price indices such as the consumer price index. However, this does not pose a problem for NGPLT as long as preliminary estimates are not biased. In addition, the nominal value of total spending is a straightforward concept, much simpler in fact than the construction of a cost of living index, which must take substitution between goods and the effects of quality improvements into account.

Second, Sumner (2013) has suggested the possibility of creating a market in NGDP futures and having the central bank intervene in that market via purchases and sales of NGDP futures contracts to ensure that expected nominal GDP is on the target path. Since other participants in the market would stand to lose real money by being wrong in their predictions, this could lead to a situation where the NGDP future would be close to an unbiased predictor of future NGDP.

4.2 NGDPLT Would be Difficult for the Public to Understand

A shift from IT to NGDPLT would represent a challenge to central bank communications in the short term. Under NGDPLT, a central bank would have to frame its policy announcements in terms of nominal GDP falling short of or surpassing a predetermined growth path.

Few individuals can probably give an adequate definition of GDP. Without a clear understanding of nominal GDP, the public (households in particular) would have difficulty in formulating clear expectations about the future evolution of the economy, making the central bank’s policy less effective.

However, households quite likely have a fairly firm grasp on their own nominal incomes and spending. Some proponents of NGDPLT have proposed a variant in which a growth path for total labour income would be the target. This would probably be easier for households to comprehend and would also stabilize total income growth.
in the long run, although the effects over the cycle would be different since the labour share of total income fluctuates counter-cyclically.

If the goals and results of NGPLT were framed in terms that households could easily relate to, the communications problems for central banks should not be too onerous. It should be noted that IT presents its own communication problems. I have already noted above that total nominal spending is in many ways a concept that is simpler than a price index. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) show that American households put inordinate weight on gasoline prices when forming their inflation expectations, weakening the link between headline inflation and the output gap.

4.3 Future Prices Will Not be Perfectly Predictable under NGDPLT

The growth rate of nominal GDP is by definition equal to the growth rate of real GDP plus the inflation rate. If the central bank wishes to target a given rate of inflation in the long run, in order to hit that rate exactly it must be able to forecast the average rate of growth of real GDP. It would then endeavour keep nominal GDP growing at a rate equal to targeted inflation plus the estimated real growth rate of potential output. If the trend growth rate of potential output varies slowly over time for technological or demographic reasons, this just means that the slope of the growth path of targeted nominal GDP will have to be modified from time to time to cope with drift in the long run growth rate of real GDP. This would be another challenge for how the central bank communicates its policy decisions, but not an insurmountable one.

4.4 NGDPLT is Not an Instrumental Rule

We have already noted that NGDPLT is agnostic as to the exact choice of monetary policy instrument by the central bank.

Most analyses of nominal GDP targeting are vague on the exact implementation in
terms of a policy rule. Taylor (2013) emphasizes this point. Quoting himself from 1985, he writes “The actual instrument adjustments necessary to make a nominal GNP rule operational are not usually specified in the various proposals for nominal GNP targeting. This lack of specification makes the policies difficult to evaluate because the instrument adjustments affect the dynamics and thereby the influence of a nominal GNP rule on business-cycle fluctuations.”

I have already argued above that NGDPLT is perfectly compatible with a feedback rule for a short-term policy interest rate, and that such a policy rate would be much less likely to hit its effective lower bound than a if the central bank followed a Taylor rule under IT. I have also argued that a switch to QE in situations where the policy rate hits its effective lower bound would be more effective under NGDPLT than under IT. Finally, targeting the price of NGDP futures represents a concrete if unorthodox alternative.

4.5 NGDPLT is Subject to a Time Inconsistency Problem

Consider a central bank which is fighting to bring nominal income back down to its target path after a positive shock to either inflation or real income or both. The central bank would have to tighten its monetary policy until nominal growth falls back to its target growth path. As noted above, the bank’s job is made easier because its commitment affects expectations. If households and firms expect income growth and/or inflation to be lower they would have an incentive to reduce their spending, thus making the expectation self-fulfilling.

However, once the expectation of the reduced growth rate of nominal income reduced private spending, the central bank has an interest to renege on its tight monetary policy. By letting bygones be bygones and not getting nominal income back to its growth path, the costs in terms of lost output of bringing nominal spending back to its target growth path could be spared.
This is a classic time inconsistency problem. If the central bank gives into the temptation and reneges it will lose its credibility and the advantages it gains in terms of influencing expectations.

A clear mandate to the central bank defining a growth path for total spending and with stipulations concerning how the central bank will be held accountable for meeting its the target over a reasonable time horizon would circumvent this time inconsistency problem.

4.6 NGDPLT Means Losing the Nominal Anchor

A consequence of the potential time inconsistency problem is that the public has to understand that NGDPLT is symmetric. It will not only be used to correct for past undershooting of the inflation target but also for overshooting.

This is why state-contingent NGDPLT as proposed by Evans (2010) and others may be undesirable. If mistakes are only corrected in one direction (to compensate for a period when inflation is lower than target) then, if successful, such a regime would guarantee an inflation rate higher on average than the target, leading to inflation expectations becoming unanchored. A clearly-defined, symmetrical target would avoid this problem.

5 Summarizing the Arguments

In Table 1 below, I summarize the main arguments in favour of NGDPLT.

The potential benefits of NGDPLT are numerous and important. The current economic environment, with lower real interest rates and lower growth than before the financial crisis and the Great Recession, practically guarantee that IT will not function as smoothly as before. The effective lower bound on policy rates will bite much more
Table 1: The Pros and Cons of NGDPLT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Arguments in Favour of NGDPLT</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History dependence</td>
<td>Mimicks the optimal policy under commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinacy of equilibrium</td>
<td>Unique long-run path for spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior in the face of supply shocks</td>
<td>Obviates the need to identify different shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets a Single Variable</td>
<td>Obviates the need to estimate potential output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better under low inflation</td>
<td>Less frequent lower bound episodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitates stimulus at lower bound</td>
<td>Makes QE more effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favours accountability</td>
<td>Bygones are not bygones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favours financial stability</td>
<td>Debt burdens are pro-cyclical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objections to NGDPLT</th>
<th>Countering the Objections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires timely information on GDP</td>
<td>Now-casting can get around this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult for the public to understand</td>
<td>Framing in terms of total income would make it no more difficult to understand than IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future prices would not be perfectly predictable</td>
<td>Make adjustments in the slope of the growth path in response to changes in the trend of real growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an instrumental rule</td>
<td>Would work with a short-term interest rate instrument and make QE more effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject to a time-inconsistency problem</td>
<td>A clearly-defined level target substitutes for commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger of unhinged inflation expectations</td>
<td>Correction of errors must be symmetrical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

quickly the next time there is a major worldwide shock or crisis. Central banks (including the Bank of Canada) have not articulated clear and detailed strategies for coping with the next crisis.

NGDPLT delivers a promising framework for developing a clear strategy before the next crisis hits. Its main advantages are the likely reduction in the probability that policy rates will hit their effective lower bound and the increased ability of central banks to provide stimulus when inflation, real growth, and interest rates are depressed. The table also summarizes some objections that have been put forward. An NGDPLT framework that is clearly articulated and explained would be able to overcome these drawbacks.
6 Conclusion

I have summarized the main arguments in favour of NGDPLT as a monetary policy framework. I believe that the most compelling of these arguments are its superior performance in the face of aggregate supply shocks, its robustness when it is difficult to distinguish among different types of macroeconomic shocks, and its superior ability to provide stimulus to the economy when short-term interest rates are at their effective lower bound.

I have also summarized some of the main objections to NGDPLT and tried to argue that they are not that important or that they can easily be met by tweaking the framework.

The question then becomes whether or not the advantages outweigh the costs involved in changing to a new monetary policy framework. These costs would include the challenges to central banks to adapt how they explain and communicate their monetary policy decisions, and the time needed for households and firms to learn how the new system works so that they will be able to form expectations about nominal income growth efficiently.

It is likely that inertia will prevent central banks from making major changes in their monetary policy frameworks in the absence of a new crisis. IT has not been a perfect regime but it has performed at least adequately, even if cracks have begun to appear in the. Most analysts believe it to be at least partly responsible for the so-called Great Moderation, the reduction in volatility of inflation and output that occurred when central banks adopted IT\textsuperscript{18}

It may take the next major crisis for central banks to envisage more than tinkering with their current monetary policy frameworks. However, by then it will be too late.

\textsuperscript{18}See Cecchetti et al. (2006) for an analysis.
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